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INTRODUCTION
I
n December 2000, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion (“FERC”) responded to the rising Western Energy Cri-
sis by issuing an order encouraging local utilities to enter
into long-term contracts, while promising to monitor the market-
based rates (“MBR”) on which
the contracts were based to
ensure that the rates met the
statutory “just and reasonable”
standard.1 The order resulted 
in a pressurized environment
requiring local utilities to hastily
negotiate expensive five-to-ten
year supply contracts or risk hav-
ing to shut down.2 Following sta-
bilization of the western energy
markets, the local utilities peti-
tioned FERC to permit alteration
of their long-term contracts to
obtain lower rates, arguing that
the rates obtained during the cri-
sis were unjust and unreason-
able.3 FERC denied their
petitions and the utilities subse-
quently filed complaints in federal court pursuant to Section
206(a) of the Federal Power Act (“FPA”).4 At the end of last year,
the Ninth Circuit issued two opinions that overturned FERC’s
decision and have the potential to significantly influence the way
FERC addresses the aftermath of the Western Energy Crisis.5
In rejecting the utilities’ petition, FERC based its decision
largely on the Mobile-Sierra doctrine.6 Taken together, the
Mobile-Sierra cases establish a presumption that energy con-
tracts are just and reasonable under the FPA, which may be
rebutted by a showing that the contract is against the public
interest.7 Because this presumption is “practically insurmount-
able,”8 FERC’s application of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine to 
the utilities’ long-term energy contracts made it virtually impos-
sible for the local utilities to overcome the public interest 
presumption. 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT CASES
The Ninth Circuit’s December 2006 companion cases limit
FERC’s application of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine to the con-
tracts arising from the long-term MBR contracts. In Public Util-
ity District No. 1 of Snohomish County v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (“PUD”)
and Public Utilities Commission
v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (“PUC”), the court
held that the Mobile-Sierra pre-
sumption comes into play only
when three “prerequisites” exist:
(1) the contract cannot have a
clause that permits unilateral
changes; (2) “the regulatory
scheme in which the contracts
are formed must provide FERC
with an opportunity for effec-
tive, timely review of the con-
tracted rates;” and (3) the just
and reasonable analysis must
include a consideration of the
market conditions at the time of
the MBR contract formation.9
Applying the prerequisites to the MBR contracts, the court
quickly dispatched the first prerequisite and then turned to
examine FERC’s regulatory review.10 By failing to fulfill its
promise to the local utilities to oversee the MBR contracts and
then peremptorily applying the tough Mobile-Sierra presump-
tion, “without any direct inquiry into whether the resulting rates
were in fact ‘just and reasonable,’” FERC committed a “funda-
mental procedural error.”11 The lack of “meaningful opportunity
to institute a challenge” to the rates that the sellers charged the
local utilities before they entered into the disputed contracts con-
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stituted “the fatal flaw in FERC’s approach to ‘oversight’ . . . pre-
clude[ing] timely consideration of sudden market changes and
offer[ing] no protection to purchasers victimized by the abuses
of sellers or dysfunctional market conditions that FERC itself
only notices in hindsight.”12 Next, the court examined market
conditions at the time the con-
tracts were formed and found
fault with FERC’s lack of con-
sideration of the relationship
between the high “spot” market
prices and the pressure brought
to bear on the utilities to enter
into long-term MBR contracts to
obtain lower rates.13
The court also questioned
whether Mobile-Sierra applied
at all. However, if Mobile-Sierra
applies, the Ninth Circuit found
that FERC incorrectly applied
“low-rate” challenge factors to
“high-rate” cases because the public interest in each type is pro-
foundly different.14 In “low-rate” challenges, such as Mobile and
Sierra, the public interest “is in keeping utilities in operation so
that the public is not deprived of services;” whereas in “high-
rate” challenges, the public interest lies in making sure the “pub-
lic pays fair rates for the very energy covered by the challenged
contracts.”15 Therefore, where a contract at issue “imposes any
significant cost on ultimate customers because of a wholesale
rate too high to be within a zone of reasonableness, that contract
affects the public interest.”16 With these new instructions, the
court remanded back to FERC for a determination as to whether
the Mobile-Sierra prerequisites exist, and if so, to consider the
correct “high-rate” public inter-
est factors.17
CONCLUSION
The decisions are likely to
have wide-ranging implications.
For example, close to two hun-
dred MBR contract appeals are
still pending in the Ninth Circuit
and the decisions will likely
induce some cases to settle.18
Taken to the extreme, the deci-
sions might even require FERC
to return to a case-by-case
review of electricity supply con-
tracts.19 The decisions could
also have implications beyond MBR cases: to date, at least one
FERC Administrative Law Judge has applied the PUD/PUC pre-
requisites in a settlement context, finding that the parties’
energy-related agreement violated the third prerequisite because
it did not properly account for potential changes in market con-
ditions.20 However, the full implications of the court’s decisions
have not yet fully materialized.
Taken to the extreme, 
the decisions might 
even require FERC to
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review of electricity
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